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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EVIDENCE CODE
SECTION 413 IN CRIMINAL CASES
Section 413 of the new California Evidence Code, which becomes operative
January 1, 1967, provides:
In determining what inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the case
against a party, the trier of fact may consider, among other things, the party's
failure to explain or to deny by his testimony such evidence or facts in the case
against him, or his willful suppression of evidence relating thereto, if such be
the case.
The 1965 United States Supreme Court holding in Griffin v. Californial has
placed in question the validity of section 413 in light of the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. The Griffin rule "forbids either comment by the prose-
cution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is
evidence of guilt."2 The purpose of this note is to examine section 413 and the
effect of the Griffin rule upon its validity.3
The California Comment Rule
California first allowed a criminal defendant to be a witness in his own trial
in 1866.4 Three years later, People v. Tyler5 brought before the California Su-
preme Court the issue of comment by the prosecutor on the failure of the accused
to testify. The court reversed Tyler's conviction, holding that such comment was
inconsistent with the defendant's rights under the California constitution.6
Tyler was followed for sixty-five years until the California constitution was
amended in 1934. The addition provides:
[Blut in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to
explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him
may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered
by the court or the jury.7
The amendment was proposed following studies made by the American Law
InstituteB and the American Bar Association.9 The passage of the amendment
placed California in accord with the views of the Model Code of Evidence pub-
lished in 1942, but contrary to the laws of a vast majority of the states.10
1380 U.S. 609 (1965).
21d. at 615.
3 This note is not concerned with the validity of section 413 in civil cases.
4 Cal. Stat. 1865, ch. 644, §§ 1-2, at 865 (1866).
5 36 Cal. 522 (1869).
6 CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (1849), now CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 13 (1879).
7 CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13 (initiative amendment adopted Nov. 6, 1934).
8 AL FRoCENGS 202-18 (1930-1931).
9 56 A.B.A. Ra'. 137-52 (1931). See generally Bruce, The Right to Comment on




The comment rule was refined in 1946 in People v. Adamson." The California
Supreme Court held that there was a distinction between the evidence the accused
fails to explain or deny, and the accused's invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 12 The former was a proper subject for comment; but comment on
the latter was considered a penalty for invoking a privilege, and, therefore, was
unconstitutional.
Adamson further held that the inference from unexplained or undenied evi-
dence could be made only from the evidence which was within defendant's
"power" to explain or deny.'3 The court went on to say that the prosecution must
first prove every element of the crime without the aid of the inference.' 4 In
other words, a prima facie case must be made out before comment is allowed.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,15 the case was argued on the
theory that the comment rule was violative of the fifth amendment's protection
against self-incrimination, as applied to the state courts by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Rejecting this contention, the Court followed its
decision in Twining v. New Jersey,16 where it had refused to apply the fifth
amendment to state courts. As for the California comment rule, the provision
was assumed to be in violation of the fifth amendment for purposes of argument
only.17 Thus, the question eventually brought before the Court in Griffin was
left undecided.
In 1964, the Supreme Court discarded the doctrine of Twining and Adamson
and held, in Malloy v. Hogan,'s that the fifth amendment was applicable in state
criminal trials via the fourteenth amendment.
Subsequent to the Malloy decision, but prior to Griffin, the California Su-
preme Court in People v. Modesto' 9 once again had an opportunity to consider
the comment rule. This time it was tested in light of the guarantees of the fifth
amendment. The court surmised that the jury will probably draw inferences from
accused's silence anyway, and indicated that the comment and instruction serve
to clarify the matter.20 Moreover, the court felt that the rule was fair since the
prosecution must make out a prima facie case before comment is allowed. 21
Finally, the court pointed out that the federal no comment rule which had been
laid down in Wilson v. United States,22 was based on a federal statute,23 rather
than a constitutional provision, and thus was not binding upon the states.24
In summary, at the time of Griffin, the essential limitations on the California
127 Cal. 2d 478, 165 P.2d 3 (1946).
12 Id. at 488, 165 P.2d at 8.
13 Id. at 489, 165 P.2d at 9. This point was first discussed in People v. Albertson,
23 Cal. 2d 550, 584-87, 145 P.2d 7, 24-26 (1944) (concurring opinion).
14 27 Cal. 2d at 489-90, 165 P.2d at 9.
25 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
'6211 U.S. 78 (1908).
17 332 U.S. at 50.
Is378 U.S. 1 (1964).
'9 62 Cal. 2d 436, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965).
20 Id. at 452-53, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27, 398 P.2d at 762-63.
21 id. at 451, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 426, 398 P.2d at 762.
22 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
23 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948).
24 62 Cal. 2d at 448-49, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 427, 398 P.2d at 760.
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comment rule,2 5 reflecting thirty-one years of judicial interpretation, were: (1)
The prosecution must prove every essential element of the crime before comment
can be made on accused's failure to explain or deny evidence against him, (2)
the inference may be drawn only from evidence within the power of the defen-
dant to explain or deny, and (3) the inference is to be drawn only from the evi-
dence and not from exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Griffin Case
Griffin was accused of'murder. He chose not to testify. The court instructed:
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be
expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does
not testify or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence,
the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth
of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be
reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more
probable.26
Griffin was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The
judgment was affirmed by the California Supreme Court.27 On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court,28 the case was argued on the theory that by refer-
ence to the accused's failure to testify, the defendant was compelled either to
risk self-incrimination or face an unfavorable inference by the jury. The Court
concurred with this theory.
The reasoning in Modesto, that the jury will make an adverse inference from
the silence of the accused regardless of comment, was answered by the Court in
the following passage: "What the jury may infer, given no help from the court,
is one thing. What it may infer when .the court solemnizes the silence of the ac-
cused into evidence against him is quite another."29
To the Modesto conclusion that the federal no comment rule laid down in
Wilson was based on a federal statute and not on the Constitution, the Court
replied that if, in the Wilson opinion, the words "fifth amendment" are substi-
tuted for "act" or "statute" where proper, the reasoning of Wilson is pertinent
to state criminal trials.30
Thus, the Supreme Court impliedly struck down as unconstitutional the Cali-
fornia comment rule and the applicable clause in section 13 of article I of the
state constitution.31 This is because the comment rule allows an inference to be
made, through comment and instruction, from defendant's personal lack of ex-
planation or denial. Section 13 of article I is couched in language which also
points to defendant's personal testimony: "his failure to explain or to deny by
his testimony." The holding in Griffin, which prohibits comment or instruction to
25See generally Note, 39 So. CAL. L. Rrv. 120 (1966); Note, 38 So. CAL. L. REv.
167 (1965).
26380 U.S. at 610; See also CAL. JuRY INSTR CTIONS CmmmAL (51 Rev.).
27 People v. Griffin, 60 Cal. 2d 182, 32 Cal. Rptr. 24, 383 P.2d 432 (1963).
28 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
29 Id. at 614.
so Id. at 613-14.
3 1 The Griffin holding necessarily invalidates CAL. PxN. CoDE §§ 1093(6), 1127
in situations where the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked.
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the effect that defendant's silence is evidence of guilt, necessarily leads to the
following question: What is the effect of the Griffin rule upon section 413 of the
Evidence Code?
The Origin of Section 413
Sections 412 and 413 were originally part of one section which was thought
to reflect sections 1963(5)-(6)32 and 2061(6)-(7)33 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure3 4 But one phrase was added to section 2061(6)-(7) by the Law Revision
Commission in a preliminary draft, which eventually became section 413 of the
of the Evidence Code. This addition provides: "[I]nferences unfavorable to a
party may be drawn from any evidence of facts in the case against him when such
party has failed to explain or deny such evidence or facts by his testimony... "35
This is almost the same wording used in Evidence Code section 413. That it was
meant to express the constitutional provision of section 13 of article I can be
seen from the following comment to section 913 of the Evidence Code:
Inferences may be drawn only from the evidence in the case and the defendant's
failure to explain or deny such evidence.... Section 413 of the Evidence Code
expresses the principle underlying this constitutional provision [section 13 of
article 1]36 ....
It seems, then, that section 413 has its origin from two sources: (1) The
"failure to explain or to deny" phrase reflects, in part, the principle of section 13
of article I of the California constitution, which was condemned in Grifin,37 and
(2) the "willful suppression of evidence" phrase, which is a modified version of
section 1963(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure.38
82 CAL. CODE Civ. Poc. § 1963 provides in part: "All other presumptions are
satisfactory, if uncontradicted. They are denominated disputable presumptions, and may
be controverted by other evidence. The following are of that kind .... 5. That evidence
wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced; 6. That higher evidence would be
adverse from inferior being produced . . ..
33 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 2061 provides in part: "The jury, subject to the control
of the Court, in the cases specified in this Code, are the judges of the effect or value
of evidence addressed to them, except when it is declared to be conclusive. They are,
however, to be instructed by the Court on all proper occasions .... 6. That evidence
is to be estimated not only by its own intrinsic weight, but also according to the
evidence which it is in the power of one side to produce and of the other to contradict;
and, therefore, 7. That if weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered, when it
appears that stronger and more satisfactory was within the power of the party, the
evidence offered should be viewed with distrust."
34 Revised Memorandum 64-33 of the California Law Revision Commission, May
25, 1964 (unpublished memorandum in the office of the California Law Revision Com-
mission, School of Law, Stanford University, Stanford, Cal.).
85 6 CAL.. LAw REvrsioN Coma'N, REORTs, IE CommENDATONS & STUDIs 1041,
1045 (1964) [hereinafter cited as CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N].
3 6 CAL. EvmNcE CODE § 913, comment.
37 The California Supreme Court in People v. Bostick, 62 Cal. 2d 820, 823, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 650-51, 402 P.2d 529, 530-31 (1965) held: "That portion of section 13 of
article I of the California Constitution which purports to authorize such comment must
bow to the superior mandates of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution."
38 See text accompanying note 70 infra.
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Although section 13 of article I mentions the word "comment," (referring to
prosecutions statements to a jury) section 413 of the Evidence Code states only
that "the trier of fact may consider." In other words, section 413 allows an in-
ference to be drawn, but says nothing about how the trier of fact is to know that
it should be drawn. 9 If the trier of fact is a jury, it could be told to draw the
inference either by comment or instruction. The jury might also draw the infer-
ence on its own in the absence of comment or instruction. If the trier of fact is
a judge, he will know from reading section 413 that an inference may be drawn.
Of these four possibilities Griffin involved only two: comment and instruction.,
Therefore, Griffin did not settle the question of the validity of drawing an infer-
ence since it was confined to comment and instruction. Before this question can
be discussed, it must be made clear just what inference is involved in section 413.
Distinction Between Inference From Evidence
and Inference From a Privilege
The Adamson opinion carefully pointed out two inferences which must be
distinguished: First, there is an inference drawn from evidence which stands un-
explained or undenied.40 Second, there is an inference drawn from the failure of
the accused to take the stand.41 The comment to section 412 also points out this
difference:
Sections 412 and 413, on the other hand, deal with the inference to be drawn
from the evidence in the case; and the fact that a privilege has been relied on
is irrelevant to the application of these sections.42
The principle is recognized as a basic law of evidence. Professor Wigmore
says:
It is true that the burden is on the prosecution... and that the accused is not
required by any rule of law to produce evidence. But nevertheless he runs the
risk of an inference from nonproduction. This seeming paradox... has misled a
few courts to deny that any inference may be drawn.43
The instruction in the Griffin case 44 did not distinguish between defendant's
silence and evidence which is uncontradicted. An example serves to illustrate:
D is accused of murder. He refuses to testify. The prosecution introduces evi-
dence of circumstances within defendant's knowledge which tends to make out
a case against D. The court instructs:
Case I: "Defendant's refusal to take the stand may be considered as evidence
of his guilt."
Case II: "The evidence presented against defendant is within his personal
knowledge, yet he has made no attempt to explain or to deny these facts by his
testimony."
39 The legislative committee comment to section 913 of the Evidence Code suggests
that section 413 allows comment: "Thus, for example, it is perfectly proper under the
Evidence Code [section 4131 for counsel to point out that the evidence against the
other party is uncontradicted."
40 27 Cal. 2d at 488, 165 P.2d at 8.
41 Ibid.
42 CAj. EvmFNcE CODE § 412, comment.
43 8 WMrox, EvmENcE § 2273, at 450 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
44 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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Case III: "The prosecution's evidence has not been contradicted by the evi-
dence presented by the defense counsel. This circumstance may be considered
as lending weight to prosecution's evidence."
The instruction in the Griffin ease was similar to case II. It was, in light of the
fifth amendment, equally as fatal as case I since it called attention to the defen-
dant's personal silence. The language in case III, whether communicated to the
jury by instruction or comment, is valid as a rule of evidence and does not violate
the Griffin rule since defendant could refute the evidence by introducing evidence
other than his own testimony.45
Section 413 makes the same mistake as the instruction in Griffin by referring
to "the party's failure to explain or to deny by his testimony." If comment or in-
struction are given in the exact language of section 413, they will violate the
Griffin rule. Therefore, section 413 must be construed to allow comment or in-
struction similar to case III in order to avoid invalidation on constitutional
grounds. It should be interpreted to mean that "the party's failure to explain or
to deny by his evidence" can be a proper subject for comment and instruction.
If the courts are unwilling to follow this interpretation, then the section should
be amended to give it this meaning. Section 413 would then stand for the propo-
sition expressed by Wigmore. If the section is amended as suggested, or if the
courts are willing to give the section a broad construction consistent with case
III, then section 413 taken together with section 913 would make the proper
distinction between comment or instruction on defendant's silence, as opposed
to comment or instruction on uncontradicted evidence.
The Future of Section 413
A reasonable argument can be offered to support the proposition that section
413 applies to situations other than the one considered in Griffin, and is therefore
valid as a rule of general poliey.4 6 The following discussion considers some of
these situations in which the section may be valid.
45 In Langford v. United States, 178 F.2d 48, 55 (9th Cir. 1949), it was held that
"except in those special cases where it appears that the accused himself is the only one
who could possibly contradict the government's testimony . . . the prosecutor may
properly call attention to the fact that the testimony of the government witnesses has
not been contradicted." Accord, Desmond v. United States, 345 F.2d 225 (1st Cir.
1965). These cases reveal a qualification to the proposition that comment may call
attention to uncontradicted evidence. The prosecutor must take care to see that it would
be possible for defense to contradict with evidence other than defendant's personal
testimony. Otherwise, the comment would be in violation of the fifth amendment
since it would call attention to the defendant's reliance on the privilege.
46 In the January, 1965 RECONNODmAXTON PROPOSING AN EVZCENc CODE,
the California Law Revision Commission's comment to section 913 contained the fol-
lowing language: "Nonetheless, the Malloy decision has at least cast doubt on the
validity of the California rule-reflected in Article I, Section 13 of the California
Constitution and Evidence Code Section 413-when a federal constitutional privilege
is involved." However, in the legislative committee comment to section 913, this phrase
was removed. The omission leads to two possible conclusions: either the legislature
intended to give the provision broad effect; or it merely attempted to evade the con-
stitutional issue. Compare 7 CAL. L. tvrLsioN Cow'N 164 (1965), with CAL. EvmE~cE
CODE § 913, comment.
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The Validity of the Inference
There are three inferences in this discussion which must be clearly distin-
guished: First, an inference from the accused's failure to take the stand; second,
an inference from the accused's failure to explain or deny evidence against him
by his own testimony; and third, an inference from uncontradicted evidence. As
already discussed, the third inference is valid as a rule of evidence, does not
violate Griffin, and may be brought to the jury's attention by comment or in-
struction.
The validity of the second inference, which is what section 413 allows, is not
so clear. Griffin held that the jury may not be told that it may make the second
inference by comment or instruction.47 Thus, the question narrows to whether
the second inference may be drawn by the trier of fact on its own. In other words,
may the trier of fact consider the failure of the accused to explain or deny evi-
dence against him by his own testimony, without the aid of instruction or
comment?
A negative answer to this question could be reached in the following way.
Griffin did not distinguish the first and second inferences; both were equally in-
valid as subjects of comment or instruction. The Supreme Court held, in Bruno
v. United States, 48 that a defendant had a right, based on the federal no com-
ment statute, to an instruction which prohibited the jury from making the first
inference on its own. 49 That is, the jury could not allow defendant's refusal to
take the stand to enter into its thinking on the issue of guilt. Now if the reasoning
in Griffin,50 that "fifth amendment" can be substituted for "federal no comment
statute,"61 is extended to the present circumstances, then it could be argued that
the fifth amendment gives an accused a right to a Bruno-instruction in state
criminal trials. And if there is no distinction between the first and second infer-
ences, then the accused would also have a right to an instruction prohibiting the
second inference from being made at all. Therefore, the second inference would
be invalid.
There is reason to doubt the soundness of this conclusion since the Griffin
opinion seemed particularly scornful of a procedure which "solemnizes" the de-
fendant's silence into evidence against him through comment and instruction.52
But the opinion seems to allow the jury some latitude in what it infers on its own
by observing that "What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one
thing."53 This is contrasted with what they may infer with the help of the court
or counsel. It has not been established that the fifth amendment even gives the
accused a right to an instruction which prohibits the jury from drawing the first
inference. 54 It is a somewhat tenuous step, then, to say that the fifth amendment
prohibits the second inference to be drawn by the trier of fact on its own initia-
tive without aid of comment or instruction. Therefore, the second inference may
very well be valid.
47 380 U.S. at 615.
48308 U.S. 287 (1939).
49 Id. at 293.
5o 380 U.S. at 613-14.
5 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948).
52 380 U.S. at 614.
53 ibid.
54 The Court in Grigrn reserved decision on this point. Id. at 615, n. 6.
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In practice, if the second inference cannot be commented or instructed upon,
section 413 would have its maximum effect when a judge is the trier of fact. The
possibility still exists that a jury would draw the inference contained in section
413. However, this would depend entirely upon its own reasoning, since it cannot
be told to do so. The issue will most likely be raised where the prosecutor has
made borderline comments which allude to the defendant's silence. 55 Here, the
defense counsel would request instructions to the effect that not only can no
presumption be made from defendant's refusal to take the stand (a right given
him by section 913), but also that the jury is not to consider the failure of the
defendant to explain or to deny evidence against him by his testimony. Whether
defendant has a right to this instruction under the fifth amendment will deter-
mine the validity of the inference created by section 413.
Waiver of the Privilege
Although a full consideration of waiver of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is beyond the scope of this note, 56 the recent case of People v. Ing57 has
presented an interesting question concerning the waiver doctrine and its relation
to section 413 and the Griffin rule.
Ing was charged with three counts of rape. In its attempt to show a common
scheme or plan, the prosecution had presented testimony of four women who had
gone to defendant to procure abortions. These witnesses testified that they had
received injections which rendered them unconscious, during which time they
believed defendant had engaged in sexual intercourse with them.
Defendant took the stand and denied complicity in the offense charged
against him by one of the women. He did not testify concerning the evidence
given by the other three. On cross-examination, he was questioned as to his re-
lationship with the other three. Defense counsers objection was sustained: the
question was beyond the scope of the direct examination. In his argument to the
jury, prosecution made repeated references to accused's failure to explain the
testimony of the three women. Defendant's theory on appeal was that in so com-
menting, the prosecution had violated the no comment rule laid down in Griflin.
The court, in holding that the accused's failure to explain or deny the testimony
of the women was a proper subject for comment, relied on Caminetti v. United
States5s and Johnson v. United States59 in declaring: "Since defendant in the
instant case testified on his own behalf, his contention that the comment and the
instruction by the trial court was a violation of his constitutionally guaranteed
right against self-incrimination fails. This right was waived when he became a
witness."60
55 See, e.g., People v. Culp, 241 A.C.A. 445, 50 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1966); People
v. Bowman, 240 A.C.A. 360, 49 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1966); People v. Von Blum, 236 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 943, 47 Cal. Rptr. 679 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. San Diego, 1965).
56 See generally 8 WiGmoE, EvmENcx § 2276 (McNaughton rev. 1961, Supp.
1964).
57 242 A.C.A. 261, 51 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1966).
58 242 U.S. 470 (1917); accord, People v. Clapper, 233 Cal. App. 2d 34, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 105 (1965).
59 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
60 242 A.C.A. at 273, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 324. But cf. People v. Mortenson, 241
A.C.A. 173, 50 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1966), where it was held that the case must be reversed
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Thus, a comment or instruction based on section 413 is constitutionally valid
where defendant waives the privilege by taldng the stand.
Scope of Permissible Comment
There are two aspects to the scope of permissible comment under the Griffin
rule in California. First, it must be decided how to treat cases tried prior to
Griffin which had not reached final judgment.61 Second, a test must be devised
which would provide the prosecutor some degree of certainty as to what may be
said in future trials under the Griffin rule.
The California Supreme Court ruled that the existence of the Griffin error in
comments and instructions did not make a case reversible per se in People v.
Bostick.62 The court pointed out that this holding was in line with cases prior to
the 1934 amendment. The test set out in Bostick was based on section 42 of
article VI of the California constitution. This test for reversible error is whether
a "miscarriage of justice" has resulted.63 If an instruction or comment is given
which violates the Griffin rule, the appellate court must decide if the instruction
or comment was sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to warrant a new trial.
Under the test, if the evidence is overwhelmingly against the defendant, the in-
struction or comment probably had little to do with the verdict, and the con-
viction will not be reversed. In other cases, the state's case may be less substantial
and such an instruction or comment may very well tilt the scale against the de-
fendant. Cases since Bostick have followed the same rule.64
As for future cases under the Griffin rule, the question of how to define the
scope of permissible comment remains open. The reversibility test may be suffi-
cient on appeal, but it does not help the trial court or counsel in determining if
a comment violates the Griffin rule. The test of whether or not a comment violates
forbidden ground is difficult to formulate, for it depends on the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case. In Morrison v. United States65 and again in Knowles
due to violation of the Griffin rule even though defendant had testified to his weight
at the time of arrest for use in a formula indicating the extent of intoxication. The
opinion was modified in People v. Mortenson, 241 A.C.A. 677, 678, 50 Cal. Rptr. 269,
270, where it was held that no exception should be made to the waiver rule in future
cases, especially those cases subsequent to Griffin. However, the holding was not changed
because the court felt the defendant's testimony was limited to a subsidiary fact,
advantageous to both sides in the case. Cf. People v. Steele, 235 Cal. App. 2d 798,
812-13, 45 Cal. Rptr. 601, 610-11 (1965).61 While the Supreme Court in Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406 (1966),
held that the Griffin decision was not to have retroactive application, this holding had
no effect on the cases that had not reached final judgment.
62 62 Cal. 2d 820, 44 Cal. Rptr. 649, 402 P.2d 529 (1965). The question whether
comment on accused's failure to testify is reversible error per se is now before the
United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court having held that it was
not reversible error per se in People v. Chapman, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729,
404 P.2d 209 (1965), cert. granted sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 383 U.S. 956
(1966).
63 People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 834, 299 P.2d 243, 253 (1956).
64 See, e.g., People v. Bowman, 240 A.C.A. 360, 49 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1966) (com-
ment resulted in no miscarriage of justice); People v. Moore, 239 A.C.A. 64, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 475 (1965) (violation of Griffin rule resulted in a miscarriage of justice).
65 6 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1925).
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v. United States,66 the following test was devised to determine if a particular
comment violated the federal statute: 67
Was the language used manifestly intended to'be, or was it of such character
that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the
failure of the accused to testify?68
Such a "reasonable comment" test offers little help to the prosecutor who must
tread cautiously when the self-incrimination privilege is invoked. 69
Willful Suppression of Evidence
Section 413 allows the trier of fact to make an adverse inference from a
party's willful suppression of evidence. The source of this rule is section 1963(5)
of the Code of Civil Procedure and the meaning given to this section by judicial
interpretation.
Criminal cases dealing with the subject of an adverse inference from the will-
ful suppression of evidence have produced a variety of results. If willful suppres-
sion is taken to mean a party's failure to explain or to deny by his own testimony
evidence within his knowledge, then the Griffin rule has invalidated this aspect
of the section in the absence of waiver. Cases prior to Griffin have cited section
1963 (5) as standing for this proposition. 70
But there are circumstances where defendant's failure to testify is irrelevant
to the willful suppression issue. In People v. Kendall,71 defendant relied on the
privilege of silence. Evidence indicated that he had attempted to keep material
witnesses from testifying before the grand jury. Defendant's wife had offered to
pay a witness' expenses if she would be absent from the state at the time of the
trial. The court held that the jury is allowed to infer a consciousness of guilt from
these actions.72
Section 1963(5) of the Civil Code of Procedure has been cited in connection
with prosecutions failure to produce witnesses. 73 People V. Crowder74 pointed
66224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1955).
67 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948).
68 Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d at 811 (8th Cir. 1925).
69 
"An indirect comment upon the failure of the accused to testify is quite as
hurtful as a direct one, and this court has often held that the consequences of the
violation of the statute were not to be avoided by the adroitness of counsel in selecting
indirect rather than direct means of disregarding it." Boone v. State, 90 Tex. Crim.
374, 377, 235 S.W. 580, 582 (1921).
70 E.g., People v. Neely, 163 Cal. App. 2d 289, 329 P.2d 357 (1958); People
v. Peters, 149 Cal. App. 2d 94, 308 P.2d 42 (1957); People v. Goldstein, 136 Cal.
App. 2d 778, 289 P.2d 581 (1955).
7 111 Cal. App. 2d 204, 244 P.2d 418 (1952).
72 Id. at 213, 244 P.2d at 424.
73 In People v. Romero, 244 A.C.A. 564, 53 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1966), comment
referring to defendant's failure to produce witnesses was held proper. The opinion
cited sections 412 and 413 of the Evidence Code: "The reference of which complaint
is made in this case did not request that an unfavorable inference be drawn from the
defendant's failure to testify, but that such inference be drawn from his failure to
produce his companions as witnesses. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2061, subs. 6 and 7;
Evid. Code, §§ 412, 413.) The reference to the defendant's constitutional right was to
distinguish his failure to testify, from which no inference could be drawn, and the
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out that failure to produce the defendant's wife as a witness permitted the in-
ference that her testimony would have been adverse to the People's case had it
been presented. However, section 413 of the Evidence Code fails to cover this
particular situation because of its narrow wording. It states: "in the case against
a party ...." This language implies that the section is to be used solely against
defendants, and not in their favor. Thus, while Crowder did come under section
1963 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it would not have come under Evidence
Code section 413. Nevertheless, section 413 is at least valid under circumstances
similar to Kendall where a defendant suppresses evidence other than his own
testimony.
The Gainey Case
United States v. Gainey7 6 questioned the constitutionality of a federal stat-
ute76 which allowed the jury to infer guilt from defendant's unexplained presence
at the site of an illegal distillery business. The Supreme Court upheld the statute,
saying there was a rational connection between the presence and the crime.77
The Court further held that the jury was permitted, but not required, to find the
defendant guilty.78
The dissenting opinion,79 by Justice Douglas, author of the majority opinion
in Griffin, revealed the inconsistency of the majority holding in light of the federal
no comment rule. Douglas argued that the Court's ruling compelled a defendant
to risk self-incrimination or face an inference of guilt by the jury. The majority
opinion answered by saying that "the judge's overall reference was carefully di-
rected to the evidence as a whole, with neither allusion nor innuendo based on
the defendant's decision not to take the stand."80
The California case of People v. DeLeon8 l concerned the possession of stolen
property, which finust be explained at the peril of an inference of guilt of the
crime of burglary,8 2 much like the federal statute in Gainey. The court's opinion
gives a clue as to how future cases may resolve the Gainey-Griffin dilemma.8 3
The DeLeon holding seems to allow the jury to consider, presumably through
comment and instruction, an inference of guilt from the possession of stolen goods
if the defendant has failed to "show" that his possession was honestly acquired.
The court declared: "We have already concluded that the California rule upon
which this instruction is based.., does not compel the defendant to testify, [but]
failure to summon his companions to appear and explain his activities and state of
sobriety from which the inference was requested." Id. at 571-74, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 264-66.
74 126 Cal. App. 2d 578, 272 P.2d 775 (1954); accord, People v. Hall, 186 Cal.
App. 2d 388, 8 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1960).
75380 U.S. 63 (1965).
76 INr. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 5601(b) (2).
77 380 U.S. at 66.
78 Id. at 70.
79 Id. at 71.
80 Id. at 72. (Emphasis added.)
81236 Cal. App. 2d 530, 46 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1965).
82 People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962).
83 For a discussion of this problem see The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 Hv.
L. REv. 159 (1965).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
November, 1966]
only to 'show" that his possession was honestly acquired."8 4 Earlier discussion8 5
has suggested that section 413 be modified to read: "the party's failure to explain
or to deny by his evidence," rather than "his testimony." Quaere: Is this not
equivalent to the phrase: "the party's failure to 'show' by his evidence?" If so,
the DeLeon case reinforces the general proposition that comment may be made
to the effect that certain evidence is uncontradicted.
Conclusion
The Griffin rule has certainly limited the operation of section 413 in criminal
cases, but not to the extent of making the provision completely void. The situ-
ations presented are suggested as ways to save the section from complete in-
validity.
Certainly when there has been a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, section 413 has validity and allows comment on evidence unexplained or
undenied by the accused. Another instance where section 413 may be valid is in
eases where there is evidence of willful suppression of evidence as seen in Ken-
dall. Here, it may be that a change in the wording of section 413 is advisable in
order to avoid its narrow application against defendants only.
The Gainey and DeLeon cases, which both involved specific inferences pecu-
liar to their facts, also reveal possible situations where an inference similar to
that created by section 413 may be applied. However, these instances are less
compelling than the waiver and willful suppression situations. Comment and in-
struction on evidence as a whole to the effect that prosecution's evidence is un-
contradicted does not appear to be in violation of the fifth amendment. Here
again, it may be necessary to amend the wording of section 413 to eliminate
reference to the party's own testimony.
Finally, a more tenuous situation is presented where the jury is permitted to
draw an inference, without the aid of instruction or comment, from the defen-
dant's lack of explanation or denial of adverse evidence by his testimony. In this
situation, section 413 would prohibit instructions directing the jury to ignore the
fact that certain evidence is unexplained or undenied by defendant's testimony.
Griffin seems to condone this view by certain language contained in the opinion.88
Carl A. Leonard*
84236 Cal. App. 2d at 539, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
85 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
86 See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
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